<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Pki on Lorbic</title><link>https://lorbic.com/tags/pki/</link><description>Recent content in Pki on Lorbic</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en</language><lastBuildDate>Wed, 21 Oct 2026 01:47:00 +0530</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://lorbic.com/tags/pki/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>The eMudhra CA Compromise</title><link>https://lorbic.com/emudhra-ca-compromise-web-pki/</link><pubDate>Tue, 20 Oct 2026 21:00:00 +0530</pubDate><guid>https://lorbic.com/emudhra-ca-compromise-web-pki/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;Backend services, Go workers, and API gateways making outbound HTTPS calls to third-party endpoints rely on a TLS security model with a critical operational gap: when a public Certificate Authority is compromised, standard WebPKI revocation mechanisms do not protect backend servers.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When a Certificate Authority loses control of its keys, browser vendors push out-of-band updates within hours. Mozilla adds intermediate certificate hashes to OneCRL and rolls out emergency releases like Firefox 158.0.1. Google updates Chrome CRLSets. Apple and Microsoft push updated trust lists. Within twenty-four hours, desktop and mobile browsers reject rogue certificates without making network calls to external revocation endpoints.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>